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A large share of delegation models takes into account the effect of political
disagreement when explaining delegation. Yet, delegation models make sharply
contrasting predictions on how political disagreement translates into the level of
discretion delegated to agencies. Moreover, empirical findings are contradictory. The
current paper addresses this puzzle by disentangling mechanisms driving the effect of
political disagreement on delegation. Furthermore, we distinguish conditions
interacting with the effect of political disagreement on discretion. We apply the
conditions to the research context of the present paper: economic restructuring in thePolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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UK under New Labour, which took place in a multi-level governance setting. We
derive hypotheses on the effect of political disagreement on discretion and explore
our theoretical predictions with the use of a novel dataset on economic restructuring
in the UK under New Labour (Bennett and Payne 2000). Our analysis show that
political disagreement leads to lower levels of discretion delegated.
Torenvlied acknowledges support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
(NWO), VIDI grant 452-06-001.
1. Introduction
The delegation of powers is a fundamental aspect of contemporary policy-making and
has been studied in many different contexts: in international relations, in state-centric
national and local systems of policy-making, and in the European Union. Delegation
refers to the process whereby a decision maker transfers her authority to implement a
policy, to an independent public or private agency (Elgie 2006; Thatcher and Stone
Sweet 2002; Thomson and Torenvlied 2010). The logic of delegating powers to an
agency is that an agency has specific competences, skills, information, or simply time
that the decision maker often lacks (Kiser 1999; Strom 2000). Thus, it could be
fruitful for decision makers to delegate a large share of their authority to the agency,
provided the agency does not drift too far from the intended policy. Decision makers
do so by assigning some level of discretion to a policy, thus leaving room for the
agency to decide by itself on how to specifically implement the policy. Alternatively,
decision makers can choose to delegate only a small level of discretionary authority,
by detailing very specific procedures by which the policy has to be delivered (Epstein
and O`Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002).
In the delegation literature wide agreement exists that political disagreement
affects the amount of discretion granted to agencies (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004;Political disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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Epstein and O`Halloran 1996; 1999; Franchino, 2004; Hammond and Knott 1996;
Huber and Lupia 2001; Huber and Shipan 2000; Torenvlied 2000). Political
disagreement is reflected by the extent to which principals disagree about the most
preferred policy outcome. The effect of political disagreement on discretion is widely
studied in delegation models (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Epstein and O`Halloran
1996; 1999; Franchino, 2004; Hammond and Knott 1996; Huber and Lupia 2001;
Huber and Shipan 2000; Torenvlied 2000).
Yet, it is still an unsettled question in delegation models, how political
disagreement translates into the level of discretion delegated to agencies. Some
delegation models predict a positive effect of political disagreement on discretion
(Epstein and O`Halloran 1996, 1999; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Huber and Shipan
2002; Torenvlied 2000), whereas others predict a negative effect (Bendor and
Meirowitz 2004; Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; May 2003).
Empirical studies also show opposing findings (Epstein and O`Halloran 1996,
1999; Huber and Shipan 2002; Torenvlied 2000). Whereas some studies find a
positive effect of political disagreement on discretion (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999;
Huber and Shipan 2002), others find a negative effect (Epstein and O’Halloran 1996;
Huber and Shipan 2002), and some studies find no significant effect at all (Torenvlied
2000). We are thus presented with a puzzle.
The present research contributes to disentangling this disagreement-discretion
puzzle. Our contributions are theoretical as well as empirical. Theoretically, we
contribute in two different ways. First, we specify underlying mechanisms that could
explain the effect of political disagreement on the level of discretion delegated. This
leads us to distinguish three different mechanisms: (1) the compromise mechanism,
(2) the agency selection mechanism and (3) the coalition support mechanism. ThePolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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compromise mechanism predicts a positive effect of political disagreement on
discretion. The agency selection mechanism and coalition support mechanism predict
a negative effect of political disagreement on discretion. Second, we specify the
conditions triggering the mechanisms driving a positive effect and the conditions
leading to a negative effect of political disagreement on discretion. Four main
conditions are derived. Firstly, we predict that the involvement of decision makers in
implementation increases the likelihood of non-compliance and thereby decreases the
level of discretion granted to agencies. Secondly, we predict that the capacity of the
decision makers is important in assigning the level of discretion under political
disagreement. We expect that when the capacity of decision makers is high, the level
of discretion granted under political disagreement is lower. Thirdly, we predict that
the salience of a policy is important in explaining the effect of political disagreement
on discretion. We predict that when the salience of a policy is higher, the discretion
granted to agencies is lower. Fourthly, we expect that the decision rule is an important
condition. A highly contested decision taken under majority rule, will lead to low
levels of discretion, whereas a highly contested decision taken under unanimity rule
does not lead to low levels of discretion.
Empirically, we contribute to the knowledge of the effect of political
disagreement on discretion in the following way. We apply our theoretical findings to
the economic restructuring in the United Kingdom. In 1997, New Labor came into
power and placed a stronger emphasis on social objectives as well as the imperative
for local and regional economic development (Bennett and Payne 2000). This resulted
in a major revision of the existing economic policies. Four major policies can be
distinguished: Local Learning and Skills Councils (LLSC) the Small Business Service
(SBS), the Regional Development Agencies (RDA) and the New Deal (ND). ThePolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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LLSC are sub-regional bodies to contract for the supply of training and vocational
education. The SBS constituted a network of local outlets providing information,
advice, help with government grants, and a referral service to other public and private
sector suppliers. The focus of the RDA was as business-led agencies concerned with
physical economic development, workforce skills, physical infrastructure, higher
education and regional economic needs (Bennett and Payne, 2000: 70). The ND
involves specific training and job-placement programmes for the unemployed, and a
reform of the welfare benefits system, the tax system, and the way in which education
and training is financed, accredited and quality assured (Bennett and Payne, 2000:
105).
Decision making on the economic restructuring took place in a multi-level
governance setting. It is interesting to study delegation in this setting, as delegation in
multi-level governance is characterized by non-hierarchical exchanges between
institutions at the transnational, national, regional and local levels (Hix 1998; Hooghe
1996; Jachtenfuchs 1995; Marks 1993, 392; Smith 1997). This leads to horizontal
patterns of delegation, whereby actors involved in decision making are also involved
in implementation. The non-hierarchical exchanges implies that delegation becomes
more complex, as decision making and delegation is dispersed across multiple centers
of authority (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Thatcher 2002). This in contrast to classical
vertical delegation patterns, whereby a clear distinction exists between decision
makers and implementation agencies. Yet, delegation in multi-level governance is
largely understudied in the delegation field. Most studies of delegation focus on these
vertical delegation patterns in formalized institutions. The present paper will study
delegation in the more complex, horizontal patterns of delegation in the context of
multi-level governance.Political disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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We specify our hypotheses on the effect of political disagreement on
discretion, by applying the four conditions to the multi-level context of economic
restructuring in the UK. We derive the hypothesis that in the present research context,
we expect a negative effect of political disagreement on discretion. Furthermore, we
expect that the salience of an issue negatively affects discretion.
We explore our hypotheses with the use of an existing comprehensive data-set
of local and regional economic development policy in the United Kingdom under
New Labour (Bennett and Payne 2000) complemented with an additional data
collection. The dataset addresses all four areas of economic restructuring: RDA, ND,
LLSC, and SBS. Decision making about 43 policy issues within these four policy
areas is included in the analysis. On average, 26 actors were included in the
negotiations for each policy issue. These actors are the ‘principals’ in the delegation
model, but can also include implementation agencies, given the multi-level nature of
the negotiations. The dataset contains precise information about the policy preferences
of all actors involved in the negotiations. For each issue we measured the levels of
political disagreement of the negotiations while taking into account the relative power
of each actor. In addition, we collected additional data in order to measure the level of
discretion per issue.
2. Theory
Political Disagreement and Discretion: Mechanisms and Conditions
Principals often delegate the implementation of policies to agencies. When delegating,
principals will give agencies some room for interpretation and authority in
implementing the policy. The level of discretion of the policy reflects this room for
interpretation. In particular, the level of discretion delegated to an agency is expressedPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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in the content and description of the policy outcome (Epstein and O`Halloran 1996;
Franchino 2004; Huber and Shipan 2002). The level of discretion is higher when
criteria for meeting standards and guidelines are vague, and when authority for
restricting ??? exceptions is low (Balla 1999; Bawn 1997; McCubbins 1985;
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Moe 1989; Torenvlied 2000).
Research has shown that political disagreement plays a pivotal role in
processes of regulatory design (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Epstein and O`Halloran
1996; 1999; Franchino, 2004; Hammond and Knott 1996; Huber and Lupia 2001;
Huber and Shipan 2000; Torenvlied 2000). A large share of policy decisions is not
reached in harmony but under political disagreement. In the United States, periods of
divided government exist in which the House and Senate are dominated by different
decision makers. In Western-European parliamentary systems with proportional
representation, coalition governments are formed between decision makers with often
highly diverging preferences.
Delegation models make sharply contrasting predictions on how political
disagreement translates into the level of discretion delegated to agencies. There are
delegation models predicting a positive effect (Epstein and O`Halloran 1996, 1999;
Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Huber and Shipan 2002; Torenvlied 2000) and delegation
models predicting a negative effect of political disagreement on discretion (Bendor
and Meirowitz 2004; Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; May 2003). Furthermore, the
empirical findings are contradictory (Epstein and O`Halloran 1996, 1999; Huber and
Shipan 2002; Torenvlied 2000).
In the present paper we aim to resolve this puzzle by disentangling the
mechanisms driving the effect of political disagreement on discretion and by
specifying the conditions triggering the different mechanisms.Political disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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Compromise
The first mechanism driving the effect of political disagreement on discretion is the
compromise mechanism. The compromise mechanism predicts that political
disagreement positively affects discretion. A strictly prescribed policy requires the
existence of a shared vision between decision makers. Obviously, for decision-makers
it is quite difficult to decide on a strict policy when they have diverging policy
preferences (e.g. Epstein and O`Halloran 1996, 1999; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990;
Huber and Shipan 2002; Torenvlied 2000). As it is becomes more difficult to agree on
a strict policy, principals have stronger incentives to reduce transaction costs by
compromising (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Hill and Brazier 1991; Horn 1995; Horn
and Shepsle 1989; McCubbins 1985; McCubbins and Page 1987). As a result policies
lack coherence, are vague or display goal ambiguity leaving room for manoeuvre and
thus display high levels of discretion (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Ferejohn and
Weingast 1992; Hill and Hupe 2002; May 1993, 2003; McCarthy 2007; Thomson and
Torenvlied 2010). Thus, the compromise mechanism suggests that more discretionary
authority is delegated because defining a strict policy is harder and more costly under
political disagreement.
A crucial condition for the compromise mechanism to occur is that the
legislature has limited capacity. We expect that when the legislature has enough
capacity to write detailed policy (and thereby delegating less discretionary authority),
the compromise mechanism will not hold. The reason is that the extra costs of writing
a detailed policy under political disagreement will not lead to more discretion granted,
as the capacity of the legislature is high enough to cover these extra costs. Empirical
studies underline this prediction. John Huber and Charles Shipan (2002) show thatPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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under divided government more discretion is granted to agencies than under unified
government (Huber and Shipan 2002: 218). However, they also show that divided
government produced more policy details, when states have a sufficient level of
capacity to write specific policies. Without such capacity, divided government indeed
tends to result in more discretion granted to agencies (Huber and Shipan 2002; 217 -
218).
Yet, a crucial aspect that is often overlooked in the literature is the willingness
of the legislature to invest this capacity. We assume that the willingness to invest the
capacity highly depends on the salience of the issue. The reason is that the benefits of
compliant implementation are higher for highly salient policy issues. Ceteris paribus,
benefits are more likely to outweigh the costs for limiting discretion. We assume that
the legislature is more likely to yield its capacity to write detailed policies, when an
issue is more salient. In line with the argumentation for the capacity condition, we
expect that for high salient issues, there is less recourse to the compromise
mechanism. Thus, we expect that political disagreement tend to result in less
discretion granted to an agency, as the capacity and issue salience of an issue are high.
Agency Selection
The second mechanism behind the effect of political disagreement on discretion is the
agency selection mechanism. The agency selection mechanism predicts a negative
effect of political disagreement on discretion granted to agencies and builds on the
classic ally principle. The idea is that when principals have divergent preferences it is
harder to find an agency backed by some winning coalition. As a result, it is more
likely that the policy preferences of the agency will differ from the policy outcome as
decided by the principals. According to the classic ally principle, decision makers willPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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delegate less discretion to agencies who do not share the same policy objectives, as an
agency is assumed to strive to implement the policy close to their preferred policy
position (Bawn 1997; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999;
McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1989). Thus, political disagreement increases the
threat of non-compliance as it is harder to find an agency with similar policy
preferences and therefore less discretion will be granted to agencies (e.g. May 2003;
O’Toole 2000; Torenvlied 2000).
A crucial condition for the agency selection mechanism is a lack of agencies
who share similar policy objectives as the policy decision. The assumption is that this
is more likely when the level of political disagreement is higher. The absence of an
implementation agency sharing similar policy objectives is even more likely when the
decision makers are also involved in implementation. We expect that when actors
manage to reach a decision, some actors will still hold diverging policy objectives.
Under the condition that actors may be conceived of as decision makers and
implementing agencies, these diverging policy objectives are not only an indicator of
political disagreement, but are also an indicator of the conflict between decision
makers and agencies (Thomson and Torenvlied 2010). Furthermore, the ally principle,
states that all else equal, decision makers will delegate more discretion to agencies
who share the same policy objectives (e.g. Bawn 1997; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004;
Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1989). Thus, we expect
that less discretion is delegated, when actors who are involved in decision making as
well as in implementation have diverging preferences.
Empirical studies seem to underline this. In particular, David Epstein and
Sharyn O`Halloran (1996) show that conflict between congress and the president
results in the delegation of less authority. Moreover, Epstein and O`Halloran (1999)Political disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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report that conflict between committees and the floor leads to higher levels of
discretion. In the U.S. Congress, the oversight committees are closely involved in
implementation, whereas the president is not. In addition, studies of delegation in the
European Union show remarkable differences between the delegation of power to the
commission and delegating powers to member states (Franchino 1999; Thomson and
Torenvlied ff). In EU policy making, member states are directly involved in the
implementation of directives, and the commission monitors progress in
implementation. These empirical studies seem to underline that when actors are
involved in decision making as well as in implementation; the effect of political
disagreement on discretion seems to be negative. Thus, we state that the (institutional)
function of political actors in decision making and their involvement in policy
implementation is a condition that strengthens the agency selection mechanism.
Coalition Support
A third mechanism, the coalition support mechanism, predicts that political
disagreement increases the probability of non-compliance. This mechanism is
described in the classic work of Matthew McCubbins, Robert Noll and Barry
Weingast (1989). They state that when principals have conflicting preferences,
agencies are faced with ‘multiple principals’ who prefer different policy outcomes.
The result is that some principals may favor non-compliance, while other principals
may disapprove of non-compliance. Agencies with a policy preference that differs
from the policy outcome could benefit from such a lack of commitment among
principals in order to pursue their own preference when implementing the policy.
Consequently, the principals who favor the original policy outcome will have a strong
incentive to ‘keep tabs’ on the implementation process. Because of the threat ofPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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support for non-compliance, they will grant less discretionary authority to agencies
(McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989).
A crucial condition for the coalition support mechanism is the decision rule
applied. The coalition support mechanism occurs when political actors have diverging
preferences on decisions taken with the majority rule. Under unanimity rule, the
disagreement among principals after the decision taken is rather low. Consequently
the threat of non-compliance is less apparent, as agencies can hardly benefit from
disagreement among principles in order to pursue their own preference when
implementing the policy. Moreover, empirical findings provide evidence for including
the decision rule as a crucial condition for the effect of political disagreement on
discretion. In particular, Fabio Franchino (1999) and Robert Thomson and René
Torenvlied (2010) show that for EU decision making under majority rule, higher
levels of conflict lead to low levels of discretion. On the other hand, political
disagreement on decisions taken under unanimity rule leads to high levels of
discretion. We thus state that the decision rule is a crucial factor in predicting the
effect of political disagreement on discretion.
All in all, we can distinguish four conditions that affect the size and direction of the
effect of political disagreement on delegated discretionary authorities. Firstly, when
decision makers are involved in implementation, it becomes more likely that political
disagreement leads to lower levels of discretion, because of the high probability of
non-compliance. Secondly, the capacity of decision-makers to specify detailed
policies is important. If this capacity is high, we expect a negative effect of political
disagreement on discretion. Thirdly, when an issue is highly salient we expect a
negative effect of political disagreement on discretion. Fourthly, the decision rulePolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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interacts with the effect of political disagreement on discretion. Under majority voting
we expect the effect to be negative, while under unanimity voting the effect will be
positive.
On the basis of these four conditions we distinguished, we can now derive
hypotheses for the effect of political disagreement on discretion for the multi-level
context of local and regional economic development in the United Kingdom. We do
so by applying the conditions to the research context of the present paper.
3. Hypotheses
Institutional Conditions Applied to the Economic Restructuring in the UK
In this section we specify hypotheses on the effect of political disagreement on
discretion in the present research context. We derive hypotheses by applying the four
conditions to the context of economic restructuring in the UK. We first specify the
actors involved. Subsequently, we focus on the capacity of decision makers and the
salience of each issue. Finally, we specify the decision rule applied in the multi-level
governance setting of decision making.
Decision making on the four policy areas of economic restructuring in the UK
took place in a multi-level governance setting. Different actors from the national,
regional and local level were involved in policy making. The actors were responsible
for the decision making as well as the implementation of these decisions at the
different levels. Figure 1 gives an overview of the different policy areas under study
and presents a simplification of the complex web of central departments and other
agencies at national, regional and local levels involved in the decision making and
implementation of these four economic development policy initiatives under study in
the present research.Political disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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[figure 1 about here]
At the central government level the responsibility for economic development
lay with three main departments. Moreover, given the multifaceted nature of local and
regional economic development, the policy process drew the involvement of
numerous other government departments also, including the Treasury, the Home
Office and the Department of Social Security. At the UK regional level, there were
three agencies for economic development. These included the Government Office of
the Regions, the newly established Regional Development Agencies, the Regional
Chambers, and the Government Office of the Regions. Local government in the UK,
comprising locally elected representatives and appointed officials, also played a key
role in leading and supporting policy initiatives towards local economic development
(Bennett and Payne 2000). Alongside various business and economic agents, a range
of social and public agents, were involved in the decision making and implementation
for the various policy initiatives under study.
The capacity for the economic restructuring was high. The vast majority of
actors involved in the negotiations and implementation of the economic restructuring
were well resourced, at an organisational level, in terms of financial and
administrative expertise (Payne and Bennett 2003).
The salience of the economic restructuring was generally high. The economic
restructuring was seen as the flagship of New Labour and thus many resources were
invested in deciding on and implementing the different economic policies. Yet, some
variation existed with respect to the different issues. Some issues were of higher
salience than others. And also between actors variation existed with regard to the
salience they attached to each issue.Political disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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The decision rule during the economic restructuring is a majority rule. In
general, about 26 policy actors had to decide on the policy outcome, whereby more
than fifty percent of these decision makers had to agree ?policy-proposals before they
were accepted (Payne and Bennett 2003).
Three conditions are constant across the issues, namely the institutional function of
the actors, the capacity of the actors, and the decision rule applied. A condition that is
unstable across the issues and across the actors is the issue salience. According to the
stable conditions in the present research context, we thus expect that the policy design
mechanism will be less apparent, whereas the coalition support mechanism and the
agency selection mechanism will drive the effect of political disagreement on
discretion. When the salience of an issue is higher, we expect this to suppress the
policy design mechanism. We can now specify the following hypotheses for the
research context of the present paper:
H1: In the research context of economic restructuring in the UK, political
disagreement negatively affects the level of discretion granted to agencies.
H2: In the research context of economic restructuring in the UK, the negative
effect of political disagreement on discretion is stronger, the higher the
salience.
4. Data and design
We explore the hypotheses with the use of an existing dataset on social and economic
restructuring in the UK under New Labor (Bennett and Payne 2000) complementedPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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with an additional data collection. The existing dataset includes specific information
about 43 negotiated policy issues. For each of the policy issues, the dataset contains
information about the policy preferences, the salience and the power of each actor
involved in decision making. The level of discretion is constructed by performing an
additional data collection. We collected additional policy and governmental
documents on each of the 43 policy issues. The extra documents were combined with
the existing data to perform a content analysis in order to measure the level of
discretion for each issue.
Method of data collection
The method of data collection as used by Bennett and Payne (2000) can be best
described as a combination between qualitative and quantitative methods of data
collection. This unique method for data collection is based on an approach that has its
roots in comparative studies of national policy-making (Laumann and Knoke 1987)
and was further developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1999). It combines the
strengths of qualitative data collection with quantitative analysis. Recent applications
of this approach can be found in international relations (Bueno de Mesquita 1999),
local policy-making (Torenvlied 2000), studies in European policy-making (Stokman
and Thomson 2004; Zimmer et al. 2005; Thomson et al. 2006) and European policy
implementation (Torenvlied 2007).
The following steps are performed by Bennett and Payne (2000) to collect
information on the policy issues. Firstly, interviews with experts and key negotiators
were used to define the policy issues and the range of possible positions and
outcomes. The interview process was also supplemented by use of existing literature,
parliamentary debates, and parliamentary committee proceedings, press coverage andPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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other documentary sources. Subsequently, more exact information about each agent is
gathered via more than 60 interviews with key individuals and organizations involved,
including ministers and senior civil servants. In addition, a check was carried out on
the definition of the key issues and the relative power positions of themselves and
other key agents. This allowed a process of triangulation of each agent’s individual
assessments of themselves and others. For the key negotiators a check was made on
the relative power of all agents. The key negotiators in most cases were senior civil
servants in the government department responsible for the chief financial resources
under negotiation.
The additional data on the level of discretion is collected with the use of policy
documents and governmental documents. Some of these documents were also used by
Bennett and Payne (2000) in the existing dataset, but for most policy issues more
documents were needed in order to have a complete overview of the policy
description. The additional documents were collected using governmental debates,
policy documents and formal governmental documents. Furthermore, intensive
contact with different governmental departments concerned with economic
restructuring should minimize the chance that some documents are overlooked.
Measurement of the dependent variable: discretion
The dependent variable of the present study is the discretionary authority delegated to
implementation agencies. The method we use to measure discretion is closest to the
work of David Epstein and Sharon O`Halloran (1999) and the work of Fabio
Franchino (2004) and Robert Thomson et al. (2007) who define discretion on the
basis of a content analysis of selected provisions. We performed a more direct content
analysis based on the theoretical concept. The theoretical concept of discretion statesPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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that the level of discretion is higher when the description of the policy is vague and
thereby leaves room for interpretation. Moreover, discretion is high when criteria for
meeting standards and guidelines are vague, and when authority for exceptions is low
(Balla 1999; Bawn 1997; McCubbins 1985; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989;
Moe 1989; Torenvlied 2000). We scored each policy issue on the basis of four
theoretical defined characteristics of discretion (Balla 1999; Bawn 1997; McCubbins
1985; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Moe 1989; Torenvlied 2000). Scholars
showed that discretion is lower, when (i) the description of the policy is strict and
leaves no room for interpretation; (ii) strict guidelines are specified; (iii) criteria for
meeting standards are specified; (iv) authority for exceptions to the policy rules is
low. We coded the text of all policy documents using selected search terms. For each
criteria, a policy issue could score zero or one point. With a zero indicating that the
criteria is not met, and one point if the criteria is met. Subsequently, we simply made
a sum, resulting in a score between zero and four. Finally we rescaled the discretion
by adding one to the final discretion score, resulting in a score between one and five.
See also table 1 for a detailed description of the coding.
Measurement of political disagreement and salience
The level of political disagreement was compiled with the use of data derived from
the existing dataset on social and economic restructuring in the UK under New
Labour (Bennett and Payne 2000). In order to compile a measure for the political
disagreement on each issue, we used the data on the policy positions of each actor.
Policy issues were hereby viewed as issue continua or scales. Each of the issue
continua is defined as a one-dimensional ordering of alternative courses of action, and
each actor (parties and agencies) who has an interest in the issue can be placed on aPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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point on the continuum to represent the course of action (position) it favors. Points on
the scale that lie further away from an actor’s position are evaluated less favorably by
that actor. The two extreme positions on each issue continuum represent the most
extreme positions considered in the negotiations in city council. Subsequently, the
measure of political disagreement was computed as the weighted standard deviation
of most preferred outcomes of the decision makers. The weights are the capabilities of
each political actor, as a simple indicator of the relative impact of each actor in
negotiations.
In addition to the main independent variable –political disagreement- we
included the salience of each policy issue. For each actor, the salience was derived
from a priority list of policy issues. Differences in salience attached to policy issues
aim to reflect relative differences in priority set by the decision makers. These relative
differences were rescaled between zero (actor attaches no salience to the policy issue)
to 100 (actors attaches extremely high salience to the policy issue). For each issue we
calculated the average salience of all actors. We thereby have a measure of issue
salience. In addition, to control for high variation between the salience each actor
attaches to a specific issue, we compiled a measure that includes salience as an actor
characteristic. We thereby include the salience in the measure of political
disagreement, by weighting the position of an actor by the salience the actor attaches
to the issue.
Control variables
We control for the number of decision makers included in the analysis. We expect that
as more decision makers are involved in decision making, it becomes harder to agree
on a specific policy. We thereby expect that the compromise mechanism will bePolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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strengthened. We thus expect that the number of decision makers positively affects
the level of discretion granted to agencies.
In addition, we control for the type of issue. We thereby differentiate between
(i) content issues and (ii) boundary issues. We expect that for content issues the level
of discretion is lower, as this type of issue consists of decisions taken about the
substance and composition of the policy. The discretion in the boundary issues is
expected to be higher, as they serve as a sort of baseline and general decision, rather
than a detailed step-by-step description.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables as well as for the
control variables.
[Table 2 about here]
We precede our analysis in two steps. The first step in our analysis is to investigate
the overall effect of political disagreement on delegated discretionary authorities. The
second step is to explore the interaction effect with salience. We will do so with the
use of the actor specific salience and the issue specific salience.
5. Results
The level of discretion granted to agencies is expected to be explained by the level of
political disagreement among decision makers (hypothesis 1) and by the interaction of
this political disagreement with the level of salience (hypothesis 2). We explore our
hypotheses with the use of two models. The first model includes the main independent
variable, political disagreement. Furthermore, the control variables, number ofPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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decision makers and type of issue are included in the model. In the second model, we
add the interaction effect of political disagreement and issue salience.
Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis with discretion as the
dependent variable. The first column of table 3 displays the results of the first model.
The results of the second model are displayed in the second column.
[Table 3 about here]
First, we explore hypothesis 1, predicting that for higher levels of political
disagreement less discretionary authority is delegated to agencies in the context of
regional restructuring in the UK. The effect of political disagreement on discretion is
taken into account in model 1 and in model 2. Model 1 estimates the results of the
analysis on the effect of political disagreement on discretion controlled for the type of
decision and number of decision makers. In model 2, the effect of salience is added to
the model. The first column of table 3 shows a negative and significant estimate for
the effect of political disagreement on discretion. In model 2, the effect of political
disagreement on discretion is also negative and significant. The coefficient of political
disagreement in model 1 indicates that a one-point increase in political disagreement
(range between 12 and 56) corresponds with a 0.04 decrease in discretion (range
between 1 and 5). Model 2 shows a coefficient of -.08, indicating a relatively stronger
effect of political disagreement on discretion when the effect of salience is included in
the model. These results support hypothesis 1 and indicate that in the present research
context of economic restructuring in the UK in multi-level governance setting,
political disagreement indeed leads to lower levels of discretionary authority
delegated to agencies.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the effect of political disagreement is stronger when
the salience is higher. Model 2 estimates the results of the analysis on the interactionPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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effect of political disagreement and salience on discretion, controlled for the type of
decision and number of decision makers. Table 2 shows that the effect of issue
salience is negative, but not significant. Furthermore, the interaction effect is positive,
but also not significant. In addition, we analyzed the effect of salience when a
different measurement of salience is taken into account. This analysis repeats the non
significant results on the interaction effect of political disagreement and salience as
shown by model 2. Thus, the results of the analyses do not support hypothesis 2. In
the research context of economic restructuring in the UK, the effect of political
disagreement on discretion is not strengthened by the salience.
In addition, table 3 shows the estimates for the effects of the control variables:
type of issue and number of decision makers. Table 3 shows that in both models, the
type of issue does not have a significant effect on the level of discretionary authority
delegated to agencies. The number of decision makers also does not have a significant
effect on discretion.
The explained variance of both models is relatively high, especially when
taking into account the number of variables with a significant effect on discretion. The
adjusted R
2 shows that twenty percent of the variation in discretion can be explained
by the model.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
This paper addressed the effect of political disagreement on delegated discretionary
authorities in the context of decision making on economic restructuring in the multi-
level governance setting in the UK. The main aim of this paper was to address the
political disagreement-discretion puzzle, and disentangle mechanisms and conditionsPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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that could partly explain the highly contradictory theoretical and empirical findings on
the direction of the effect of political disagreement on discretion.
The main conclusion of the present paper is that we can partly explain the
political disagreement-discretion puzzle by taking into account the institutional
context of decision making and implementation. We thereby take a different point of
view than the classic idea of the more standard models of delegation that explains the
effect of political disagreement on delegation disregarding the institutional context
(following e.g. Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Calvert et al. 1989; Weingast 1984).
Though, other scholars do highlight the importance of the context. Huber and Shipan
(2002) already pointed at the vital role of the institutional context in explaining
regulatory designs. Yet, in the current paper, we elaborated in detail the crucial
conditions within the institutional context. This enabled us to apply the conditions to a
specific context, and derive more plausible hypotheses on the direction of the effect of
political disagreement on discretion.
We theoretically defined three main mechanisms driving the effect of political
disagreement on discretion: the compromise mechanism, the agency selection
mechanism and the coalition support mechanism. Furthermore, for each of the
mechanisms, we specified conditions triggering the mechanism and leading to a
positive or negative effect of political disagreement. Four conditions were
disentangled: (1) the institutional function of decision makers; (2) the capacity of
decision makers; (3) the salience of an issue; (4) the decision rule applied. We showed
that these conditions can explain why in some institutional context political
disagreement will lead to lower levels of discretionary authority delegated, whereas in
other contexts this effect will be positive.Political disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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Secondly, we showed that for the context of decision making on economic
restructuring in the multi-level governance setting in the UK, political disagreement
would lead to lower levels of discretion. First, as decision makers were also involved
in implementation, we predicted that the threat of non compliance was higher and
thereby that the discretion delegated would be lower (following the agency selection
mechanism). This context characteristic is typical for multi-level governance,
whereby decision makers are often involved in implementation and agencies are
involved in decision making. Second, the capacity of the decision makers was high,
and thus even though the costs of defining a strict policy under political disagreement
is high (following the compromise mechanism) the decision makers have enough
capacity to write detailed policy. Third, decisions were taken under majority rule and
thus disagreement among principals after the decision taken is rather high resulting in
a high threat of non-compliance (following the coalition support mechanism). The
analysis showed indeed a significant negative effect of political disagreement on the
level of discretion. Moreover, the model showed that political disagreement is an
important variable in explaining discretion, with a relatively high level of explained
variation of discretion.
Thirdly, we predicted that the level of salience decision makers attach to an
issue strengthens the effect of political disagreement on discretion. We expected that
besides the capacity of the legislature, the willingness to invest this capacity is crucial.
We assume that the legislature is more likely to yield its capacity to write detailed
policies, when an issue is more salient. Our analyses do not support this theoretical
prediction. We did not find a significant interacting effect of salience on the effect of
political disagreement on discretion. A possible explanation of this non-significant
effect could be the high capacity of the decision makers. It can be hypothesized thatPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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when capacity is scarce, the salience of an issue defines whether decision makers will
use the capacity to specify detailed policies. Yet, when capacity is high, decision
makers are not forced to choose on which issue to use the capacity, and thus the effect
of salience might diminish.
There are several directions for future research. First, this study was restricted
to one context of decision making. We theoretically defined four conditions
interacting with the effect of political disagreement on discretion. Yet, the empirical
exploration of these hypotheses was restricted to one decision making context and
thus did not enable us to explore variation in these conditions across different
contexts. Research is needed to check the robustness of our theoretical predictions
across different contexts.
Additional research is also needed to control for the robustness of the effect of
political disagreement on discretion. Empirical analysis on large scale data is needed
to control for other factors that could explain the level of discretion. For example,
future research should include the level of ex post controls and the complexity of an
issue. As our dataset is restricted to 43 policy issues, we were restricted with respect
to the number of variables we could include in the model. As a result, our analyses
should be seen as an exploration of the theoretical findings, rather than a hard test of
results.
Furthermore, more research is needed on the measure of discretion. The
delegation literature lacks a general accepted measure of discretion that is applicable
across different policy areas. Most popular measures are applicable to laws and
provisions (e.g. Huber and Shipan 2002; Epstein and O`Halloran 1999), rather than to
policy descriptions or decisions. This paper made a first attempt to compile a measurePolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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of discretion that is more based on theoretical grounds and is applicable also to more
informal policy descriptions.
Finally, it would be interesting to check whether the mechanisms and
conditions as applied to the public sector, are robust for delegation in private
organizations. Complex power systems and divergent goals of actors are common
sense in delegation patterns in private organizations. Moreover, in private
organizations, delegation also takes place in different contextual conditions of
decision making. It would be useful to check whether the four conditions as specified
in the present paper are applicable to private organizations.Political disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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FIGURE 1
Source: Figure 1 is reproduced from the original publication by Robert. J. Bennett and Diane Payne “Local and Regional Economic Development: Renegotiating Power under
Labour” (2000: 19), Ashgate Publishing Ltd.: England. The TECs, which were superseded by the LLSCs in a transition period from April 2000-2001 are shown with dotted
lines.Political disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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TABLE 1 Level of Discretion per Policy Issue
ND TEC RDA SBS
issue p g m a Discretion issue p g m a Discretion issue p g m a Discretion issue p g m a Discretion
1 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 3
2 0 1 1 1 4 2 0 1 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 3 2 1 1 1 0 4
3 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 1 1 1 5
4 1 0 1 1 4 4 0 1 1 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 1 0 1 4
5 1 0 0 1 3 5 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 0 1 1 4
6 1 0 0 0 2 6 1 0 1 0 3 6 0 0 0 1 2
7 1 1 0 0 3 7 1 1 1 1 5 7 1 1 0 1 4
8 1 0 0 0 2 8 1 0 0 0 2
9 1 0 0 1 3 9 1 0 0 1 3
10 1 0 0 1 3 10 0 0 0 1 2
11 1 1 0 1 4 11 1 0 0 0 2
12 0 0 1 1 3 12 1 0 0 0 2
13 0 0 0 0 1
14 1 1 0 0 3
15 1 1 0 0 3
16 0 0 0 0 1
17 1 0 0 1 3
18 1 0 0 0 2
Note: Discretion scores of policy issues on four indicators: (p) policy description strict, no room for interpretation (=0); (g) guidelines specified
(=0); (m) meeting standards specified (=0); (a) authority for exceptions is low (=0). Code terms: vast numbers/percentages/budget versus a lot
of/around/minimize; stepwise descriptions versus overall final goal; forcing terms versus guiding terms; exceptions specified versus no
exceptions are permitted. Discretion is measured as: 1 + score on item (p) + score on item (g) + score on item (m) + score on item (a) =
discretionPolitical disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables in the Analysis




Discretion 42 2.9 1 5 .2
Independent Variables
Political disagreement 42 33.1 12.1 56.1 9.1
Issue salience 42 29.3 9.6 50.1 10.2
Control Variables
Type of issue 42 0.3 0 1 .5
Number of decision makers 42 26.2 16 31 6.2Political disagreement and delegation in Multi-level governance setting
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TABLE 3 Regression Analysis (Unstandardized Coefficients, Standard Error
between Parentheses. Dependent Variable: Discretion. N = 42)
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p<.1
1 A separate analysis was performed to check for the effect of salience, when taking into account
variation in the level of salience each actor assigns to a specific issue. The analyses reproduced the
results of model 2 and did not show a significant effect of salience.
Model 1 Model 2
1
Intercept 5.2 (.9)*** 6.3 (1.4)***
Political disagreement -.04 (.02)** -.08(.03)**
Issue salience -1.1(.8)
Interactions
Political disagreement * Issue .04(.02)
Controls
Type of issue .2 (.4) .3(.4)
Number of decision makers -.04(.3) -.04(.04)
R2 (adjusted) .21 .17